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This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information, when bothunlimited-usage (ﬁxed-fee) pricing and usage-based pricing are feasible and administering usage-based
pricing may involve transaction costs. It is shown that offering ﬁxed-fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage-
based pricing scheme is always proﬁt improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs, and there may
be markets in which a pure ﬁxed-fee is optimal. This implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information
goods is almost never fully revealing. Moreover, it is proved that the optimal usage-based pricing schedule is
independent of the value of the ﬁxed fee, a result that simpliﬁes the simultaneous design of pricing schedules
considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of ﬁxed-fee and non-
linear usage-based pricing. The introduction of ﬁxed-fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus
and total surplus. The differential effects of setup costs, ﬁxed transaction costs, and variable transaction costs
on pricing policy are described. These results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing
schedules. For instance, in nascent information markets, ﬁrms may proﬁt from low ﬁxed-fee penetration pricing,
but as these markets mature, the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage-based
pricing options. Minimum fees, quantity discounts, and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are
characterized, strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described, and the implications
of the paper’s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Nonlinear usage-based pricing is a popular price-
discrimination technique that has been analyzed
extensively in the context of the electricity and long-
distance telephone markets (Wilson 1993). This form
of price discrimination is used by many sellers of
information goods. For instance, corporate software
manufacturers associate the price they charge each
customer with their expected usage of the software
by basing prices on the total processing speed of the
servers on which the software is licensed to run. ASP
and application syndication models enable a variety
of more direct usage-based software pricing.1 Apple’s
iTunes music service is priced on a per-song basis.
In contrast, there are numerous examples of ﬁxed-
fee pricing for information goods under which cus-
tomers pay a ﬁxed periodic price that is independent
of usage. Most ISPs charge residential customers a
ﬂat monthly subscription fee. The Wall Street Journal
Online offers unrestricted access for a ﬁxed annual fee.
Sprint PCS recently switched from a per-Mb pricing
1 While there are a number of diverse models that these ASPs use
to price their services, most involve some form of rental pricing
(Susarla et al. 2003).
model to giving consumers unlimited wireless Web
access for a ﬁxed monthly fee.
Additionally, many sellers of information goods use
a combination of ﬁxed-fee and usage-based pricing.
A customer of IBM’s zSeries software can opt to pay
a ﬂat fee for unlimited usage, or to use a report-
ing tool that tracks and charges for software usage
on a monthly basis. In addition to their regular per-
minute pricing scheme, Sprint and AT&T both offer
ﬁxed-fee long-distance telephony, and MCI sells an
unlimited-usage local, long-distance, and Internet ser-
vice package for a ﬁxed monthly fee. Other informa-
tion goods featuring both ﬁxed-fee and usage-based
pricing include network bandwidth, the OCLC library
information services, and industry research reports.
Pricing policies for information goods which in-
clude an unlimited-usage ﬁxed-fee conﬂict with well-
known results from nonlinear pricing theory (Maskin
and Riley 1984, Wilson 1993), which have shown that
under some fairly general assumptions, the optimal
pricing policy for a monopolist should always be
strictly based on usage. One goal of this paper is to
demonstrate that this disconnect between theory and
practice can be rigorously explained by recognizing
two unique aspects of pricing information goods.
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(a) An increase in the usage of an information good
by a customer imposes near-zero or zero direct vari-
able costs of production on the seller. This makes
unlimited-usage ﬁxed-fee pricing increasingly viable
for these goods.
(b) There are typically ﬁxed and variable transac-
tion costs associated with the administering of any
usage-based pricing schedule. These costs are espe-
cially relevant when designing pricing schedules for
information goods because they are signiﬁcant rela-
tive to the near-zero variable costs of production that
characterize information goods.2
The costs of administering usage-based pricing
schedules (henceforth called transaction costs) that are
alluded to above stem from the many different activ-
ities that are necessary to viably administer a usage-
based pricing schedule. A seller must monitor and
record the details of usage for each individual cus-
tomer. Even if the direct costs of electronic monitoring
are low, the related administration of billing, pay-
ment and settlement, and dispute resolution is expen-
sive. When charged a constant periodic fee, customers
often are comfortable with automated and direct peri-
odic charges (to a credit card, for instance) with no
itemized statement. In contrast, when pricing is based
on usage, the seller periodically may need to present
each customer with an itemized statement of their
usage. This requires administering a reliable process
for the delivery of these statements. The seller may
need to mail and process nonelectronic statements
and payments for those customers unable to use, or
uncomfortable with, electronic billing.
Even computer-based usage monitoring systems
are prone to error (an example familiar to most read-
ers may be their monthly statements of long-distance
telephone usage), and this imposes additional dis-
pute resolution costs on the seller, which may be
incurred even when a customer merely conjectures
that they have been incorrectly billed. The costs of
handling related customer service calls can be sub-
stantial, even with relatively low error rates. More-
over, errors in billing, or perceptions thereof, can lead
to future lost sales. The seller may need to main-
tain auditable records of usage for each individual
customer, in the event of future customer disputes.
Clearly, many of these per-customer transaction costs
(itemized invoicing, for instance), are triggered by any
positive usage, while others (such as usage recording
and error resolution) are likely to increase with cus-
tomer usage. There may also be one-time setup costs
or periodic infrastructure costs to install and run reli-
able processes that support the activities associated
exclusively with usage-based pricing.
2 In contrast, when variable costs are high relative to these costs of
administering usage-based pricing, as is the case for many physical
goods, these transaction costs affect pricing only minimally.
These drivers of transaction costs are unrelated to
the production or delivery of the actual digital good
being sold and are simply a consequence of offering
a usage-based pricing scheme. Consequently, sellers
may want to mitigate these costs by offering some or
all of their customers a ﬁxed-fee pricing scheme. This
may seem especially attractive for sellers of mass-
market digital goods, where transaction costs are sig-
niﬁcant relative to the potential revenue ﬁrms may
obtain from each of their customers. Moreover, each
customer is likely to be willing to pay more for
the option of unlimited usage. There is a trade-off,
however—ﬁxed-fee pricing precludes second-degree
price discrimination based on usage, and this is likely
to adversely affect seller revenues.
The model in this paper analyzes this trade-off by
deriving the optimal combination of the unlimited
usage ﬁxed-fee and the usage-based nonlinear pric-
ing function, with very general assumptions about
customer preferences and transaction costs and under
incomplete information. It shows that any positive
ﬁxed or variable transaction costs make it optimal
for the monopolist to offer their customers the option
of a ﬁxed-fee pricing scheme. It also establishes that
the optimal choice of the usage-based pricing sched-
ule is independent of the value of the ﬁxed-fee—a
result that simpliﬁes the simultaneous design of pric-
ing schedules signiﬁcantly. Managerial implications
for pricing design, volume discounting, adoption pat-
terns, and market evolution are also discussed.
The optimal pricing of information systems has
been studied quite extensively, most often with a
focus on congestion pricing. This body of work
includes a queuing model of ASP pricing by Cheng
and Koehler (1999), an analysis of pricing service
facilities with nonlinear delay costs by Dewan and
Mendelson (1990), a model of usage-based pricing
in a network based on the theoretical framework of
Gupta et al. (1997), the seminal paper by Mendelson
(1985) on pricing computer services by internalizing
delay externalities, which was followed by a model of
variable priority pricing under asymmetric informa-
tion for queues by Mendelson and Whang (1990), and
a model of optimal IS pricing with network external-
ities by Westland (1992). These papers focus speciﬁ-
cally on either contrasting usage-based pricing with
alternate schemes, or pricing information systems
under asymmetric information, which makes their
models most relevant to this paper. A more detailed
survey is available from the author on request.
This paper adds to the literature by presenting a
new model directly contrasting ﬁxed-fee and nonlin-
ear pricing of information goods under a more gen-
eral analytical framework and underlining the impor-
tance of transaction costs (highlighted brieﬂy by Var-
ian 2000) in the design of optimal pricing schedules
for information goods. Two related and active areas
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of information-goods research into pricing and mar-
ket segmentation—bundling and vertical differentia-
tion (versioning)—have indirectly shed some light on
the trade-offs between ﬁxed-fee and usage-based pric-
ing, and this relationship is discussed further in §6.
2. Model
2.1. Firm and Customers
A monopoly ﬁrm sells an information good3 that may
be used by customers in varying quantities. Variable
costs of production to the ﬁrm—creating copies or
providing access to the product—are zero. Customers
are heterogeneous, indexed by their type  ∈  ¯.
The preferences of a customer of type  are repre-
sented by the function
Wqp	=Uq	− p (1)
where q is the quantity of the product used and p is
the total price paid by the customer. The function
Uq	 is referred to as the customer’s utility func-
tion. Numbered subscripts to functions denote partial
derivatives with respect to the corresponding argu-
ment. For instance, U1q 	 is the partial derivative of
U with respect to its ﬁrst argument, and U12q 	 is
the cross-partial of U with respect to its ﬁrst and sec-
ond arguments. This notation is preserved throughout
the paper.
The utility function Uq	 has the following prop-
erties, for each  ∈  ¯:
1. Increasing and concave value:
U0 	= 0; U1q 	≥ 0U11q 	 < 0 for all q.
2. Higher customer types get higher utility:
U2q 	 > 0 for all q > 0.
3. Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition:
U12q 	 > 0 for all q.
4. Nonincreasing absolute risk aversion:


−U11q 	/U1q 		≤ 0.
5. Finite maximum value:
lim
q→	Uq	= v	 <	.
Property 2 simply states that type  orders cus-
tomers based on the value they get from the product.
In addition, Property 3 implies that higher types get
a higher increase in value than lower types from the
same increase in usage. Property 4 states that higher
types are also increasingly less risk averse. Property 5
bounds the maximum value a customer can derive
from the product, ensuring that the monopolist can-
not make inﬁnite proﬁts by offering unlimited-usage
pricing. As indicated above, the utility derived from
3 This may either be a homogeneous good (such as bandwidth) or
a bundle of related heterogeneous quantity units (for instance, a
library of MP3 songs, where each successive unit of consumption
is a download of a different song).
maximal usage by type  is represented using the
function
v	= lim
q→	Uq	 (2)
The ﬁrm does not observe the type of any customer
but knows F 	, the probability distribution of types
in the customer population, and the corresponding
density function f 	, which is strictly positive for all
 ∈  ¯.
2.2. Pricing Schedules
The information good is priced using one or both of
two kinds of pricing schedules (also called contracts).
Fixed-Fee. A ﬁxed-fee contract speciﬁes a price T to
be paid by the customer in exchange for unlimited
usage of the information good. There are no trans-
action costs associated with a ﬁxed-fee contract—the
customer simply pays the ﬁrm the deterministic, pre-
speciﬁed price T .
Usage-Based. A usage-based contract assigns a spe-
ciﬁc price to each level of usage q. The ﬁrm cannot
explicitly distinguish between customer types prior to
contracting. Thus, the entire menu of quantity-price
pairs must be available to all customers. The reve-
lation principle ensures that the ﬁrm can restrict its
attention to direct mechanisms—that is, usage-based
contracts in which one speciﬁc quantity-price pair is
designed for each customer, and in which it is rational
and optimal for the customer to choose the quantity-
price pair that was designed for him or her.4 The
usage-based contract is represented by a menu of
quantity-price pairs qt	 t		, where t ∈  ¯. This
menu must satisfy two standard constraints:
[IC]: For each ,
Uq		− 	≥Uqt	 	− t	 for all t ∈  ¯
[IR]: For each ,
Uq		− 	≥ 0
When the menu of quantity-price pairs satisﬁes (IC)
and (IR), every customer of type  will choose the pair
q	 	. For brevity, a usage-based contract satisfy-
ing these constraints is simply referred to as incentive
compatible. An incentive-compatible usage-based con-
tract is said to be optimal for a subinterval L H if
it yields proﬁts that are at least as high as any other
incentive-compatible usage-based contract designed
exclusively for customers in the subinterval L H.
When no subinterval is mentioned, optimality applies
to the entire interval  ¯.
The ﬁrm bears transaction costs of Cq	 for each cus-
tomer who adopts the usage-based contract and uses a
4 This kind of formulation is standard in models of price
screening—see, for instance, Anderson (1996, §2). A good exposi-
tion of mechanism design, the revelation principle, and its appli-
cations to pricing can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991,
Chapter 7).
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Table 1 Summary of Key Notation
Symbol Explanation
Uq  Utility that customer type  gets from usage level q.
v Maximum utility that customer type  can get from usage.
v= limq→	 Uq .
 ¯	 Range of possible customer types .
f  F  Density and distribution functions of the customer type
distribution.
Cq Transaction costs of administering a usage-based pricing
schedule for a customer who uses quantity q. In §4,
Cq takes the form K + cq for q > 0.
q   Usage-based contract (menu of quantity-price pairs) that
is incentive compatible. For a speciﬁc , q is the
quantity and   is the price for that quantity.
q∗  ∗ Optimal incentive-compatible usage-based contract.
T Unlimited-usage ﬁxed-fee price.
K Lowest customer type that uses a positive quantity under
the usage-based contract.
F Lowest customer type that is indifferent between ﬁxed-fee
and usage-based pricing.
quantity q. The drivers of these costs are discussed at
length in §1. Key notation is summarized in Table 1.
2.3. Interaction Between the Firm and Its
Customers
The sequence of interaction between the ﬁrm and its
potential customers is as follows:
1. The ﬁrm designs and posts either an incentive-
compatible usage-based contract q·	 ·		, a ﬁxed-
fee contract T , or both.
2. Each customer either chooses to purchase using
one of the two pricing schedules or chooses not to
purchase. If a customer chooses the ﬁxed-fee contract,
a ﬁxed payment of T is made to the ﬁrm. Because the
usage-based pricing schedule q·	 ·		 is incentive
compatible, a customer of type  who chooses this
pricing schedule uses a quantity q	 and makes a
payment of 	.
The problem for a customer of type  is to choose
between paying a ﬁxed fee T for maximal usage (and
a corresponding value v	), paying 	 for a usage
level q	, or not participating. The problem of the
ﬁrm is to choose the kinds of contracts (ﬁxed fee,
usage based, both) to offer and to design these con-
tract(s) to maximize ex ante expected proﬁts.
3. The Optimality of Offering
Fixed-Fee Pricing
This section describes how ﬁxed-fee pricing affects
customer choice and establishes that in the presence of
nonzero transaction costs, a ﬁxed-fee pricing scheme
always improves proﬁts for the seller of an informa-
tion good. First, a preliminary result is established.
Lemma 1. If q	, 	 is an incentive-compatible con-
tract, then
(a) q1	≥ 0, 1	≥ 0.
(b) Uq		− 	 is nondecreasing in .
Unless speciﬁed otherwise, all proofs are in the ap-
pendix. The expression Uq		−	 is the surplus
obtained by a customer of type  from the contract
q·	 ·	 and is commonly referred to as the informa-
tional rent for type .
3.1. The Impact of a Fixed Fee on
Customer Choice
The main result of this subsection establishes that
when a ﬁxed fee is offered along with any incentive-
compatible usage-based contract, then customers typ-
ically bifurcate into two intervals, with lower types
adopting the usage-based contract and higher types
adopting the ﬁxed fee.
Suppose the ﬁrm offers a ﬁxed-fee contract T
along with a usage-based contract q·	 ·		, which
is incentive compatible in the absence of T . The sur-
plus that a customer of type  gets from choosing the
ﬁxed-fee contract is v	−T . Therefore, a customer of
type  will choose the ﬁxed-fee contract if and only if
v	− T ≥Uq		− 	 (3)
where it is assumed that an indifferent customer
chooses the ﬁxed-fee contract. Note that Equation (3)
is equivalent to
v	−Uq		+ 	≥ T  (4)
The expression on the left-hand side of (4) has a
simple economic interpretation. It is the difference
between the maximum value v	 obtainable by
type  from the information good and the informa-
tional rent U q	 	 − 	 that type  gets from
using under the usage-based contract. Consequently,
it is the maximum ﬁxed fee that the ﬁrm can charge
if they want type  to adopt the ﬁxed fee. Lemma 2
shows that this maximum amount is increasing in .
Lemma 2. For any incentive-compatible usage-based
contract q·	 ·		, the function
	= v	−Uq		+ 	 (5)
is strictly increasing for all  in  ¯	.
This lemma leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the ﬁrm introduces a ﬁxed fee T in
addition to an existing usage-based contract q·	 ·		
which is incentive-compatible in the absence of T , this
affects customer choice in exactly one of the following
three ways.
(a) If v	−T ≥Uq	 	−	, then all customers
adopt the ﬁxed-fee contract.
(b) If v¯	− T <Uq¯	 ¯	− ¯	, then all customers
continue to adopt the usage-based contract.
(c) If v	 − T < Uq	 	 − 	 and v¯	 − T ≥
Uq¯	 ¯	− ¯	, then customers of type  ∈  F 	 con-
tinue to adopt the usage-based contract, and customers of
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type  ∈ F  ¯ switch to the ﬁxed-fee contract, where
F =min v	−Uq		+ 	= T  (6)
Proof. Combining (4) and the fact that 	 is
increasing (as shown in Lemma 2) establishes that if
type ˆ adopts the ﬁxed-fee contract, then so do all
types  > ˆ. In addition, if type ˆ does not adopt the
ﬁxed-fee contract, then neither does any type  < ˆ.
This proves parts (a) and (b). If the conditions for (c)
hold, then because 	 is increasing in  ¯, this
ensures that there will be at least one type  for which
	 = T . Because F is the lowest such value of 
and indifferent types adopt the ﬁxed-fee contract, this
proves part (c), which completes the proof. 
As illustrated by Figure 1, T is always higher than
F 	 but may be lower than ¯	. Therefore, while
a fraction F  T  of customer types always pay a
higher price, there may be a fraction of customer
types T  ¯ that pay a lower price under the ﬁxed
fee. The ﬁrm gains revenue from the former set but
may lose revenue from the latter set. It also lowers
costs in the interval F  ¯ as a consequence of having
no transaction costs from all customers adopting T .
3.2. Proﬁt-Improving Fixed Fees
This subsection establishes that the proﬁts of a seller
of information goods can always be strictly improved
by the introduction of an unlimited-usage ﬁxed fee.
First, I establish that under the optimal usage-based
contract in the absence of a ﬁxed fee, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
from each customer is positive and nondecreasing in
their type.
Figure 1 The Impact of Fixed-Fee Pricing on Customer Choice
0
Kθ Fθ
( )v θ
( ( ), )U q θ θ
( )v θ
θ θ
( )τ θ
( ( ) ) ( )F F FU q θ θ τ θ
( )Fv Tθ
( ( ), )U q θ θ
T
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do not adopt adopt usage-based pricing adopt fixed-fee pricing
,
–
–
Lemma 3. If q∗	 ∗	 is the optimal usage-based
contract in the absence of a ﬁxed fee, then
(a) ∗	−Cq∗		 is nondecreasing in ,
(b) ∗	−Cq∗		≥ 0 for all .
The main result of the section now follows.
Proposition 2. If transaction costs are nonzero—that
is, if Cq	 > 0 for q > 0—then it is always proﬁt improving
for the seller of an information good to offer a ﬁxed-fee
contract.
Proof. Let q∗	 ∗	 be the optimal usage-based
contract in the absence of a ﬁxed fee. If q∗¯	= 0, then
from Lemma 1, q∗	 = 0 for all , proﬁts are zero,
and the ﬁxed fee T = v	 strictly improves proﬁts.
If q∗¯	 > 0, then Cq∗¯		 > 0. Now, choose any ﬁxed
fee T such that
∗¯	−Cq∗¯		 < T < ∗¯	 (7)
Because v¯	≥Uq ¯	 for all q, it follows that
v¯	− T >Uq∗¯	 ¯	− ∗¯	 (8)
and Proposition 1 ensures that a fraction F  ¯ of
customer types (perhaps all) will adopt the ﬁxed fee.
From Equation (7), we know that T > ∗¯	−Cq∗¯		.
Using Lemma 3, this implies that
∗	−Cq∗		 < T for all  ∈ F  ¯ (9)
As a consequence, the proﬁts from each customer type
in F  ¯ are strictly increased by the introduction of
the ﬁxed fee T . Proposition 1 ensures that for F > ,
customers in  F 	 continue to adopt the usage-
based contract q∗	 ∗	, and proﬁts from this seg-
ment remain unchanged. Therefore, the ﬁrm’s overall
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proﬁts are increased by the introduction of T , which
completes the proof. 
In the absence of changes to q∗·	 ∗·		, the
increase in the ﬁrm’s proﬁts is feasible as a result
of two separate effects. The ﬁrst is the elimination
of transaction costs for the adopters of the ﬁxed fee.
The second is an increase in total surplus from the
higher usage levels of these adopters, which may
induce a net increase in revenues. Recall that the ﬁrm
bears no additional variable production costs from
this increase in usage of the information good.
4. The Optimal Combination of
Fixed-Fee and Usage-Based Pricing
Proposition 2 establishes the desirability of ﬁxed-fee
pricing for information goods under very general
conditions—for any positive transaction cost function
Cq	 and for any absolutely continuous customer type
distribution F 	. In this section, the structure of the
optimal ﬁxed-fee and usage-based pricing schedules
is established in more detail. The transaction cost
function Cq	 is assumed to take the following form:
Cq	 = 0 for q = 0
Cq	 = K+ cq	 for q > 0 (10)
where K ≥ 0, c1q	≥ 0 (nondecreasing variable costs),
and variable costs are “not too concave”:
c11q	
c1q	
>
U11q 	
U1q 	
for all  (11)
The condition (11) above is met by any linear or con-
vex cost function, a cost function that is positive and
constant for all q > 0, as well as a range of con-
cave cost functions.5 As described in §1, many per-
customer transaction costs may be triggered by any
positive usage level, simply because a usage-based
pricing schedule has to be administered. Other trans-
action costs are proportionate to the level of usage of
the information good. The ﬂexible speciﬁcation in (10)
allows both these kinds of costs, and also admits vary-
ing levels of economies of scale.
The type distribution is restricted to having a non-
increasing inverse hazard rate:


(
1− F 	
f 	
)
≤ 0 for all 
This property is satisﬁed by most commonly used
unimodal distributions, and the restriction is standard
in models of price discrimination.
5 Equation (11) ensures that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is strictly
quasi-concave. It may not be a necessary condition for the results
that follow, but in its absence, the optimal contracts cannot be
mathematically characterized, because the point-wise optimization
problem is not guaranteed to have a unique local maximum.
4.1. Optimal Usage-Based Pricing in the Absence
of a Fixed Fee
The result in this subsection characterizes the struc-
ture of the optimal usage-based contract q∗	 ∗	
when the ﬁrm does not offer a ﬁxed-fee contract.
Proposition 3. The optimal usage-based contract
q∗	 ∗		 in the absence of a ﬁxed fee takes the follow-
ing form:
q∗	= 0 for  < K (12)
∗	= 0 for  < K (13)
q∗	= q0	 for  ≥ K (14)
∗	 = Uq∗	 	−
∫ 
K
U2q
∗x	 x	dx
for  ≥ K (15)
where q0	 and K are deﬁned by
U1q
0		=c1q0		+U12q0		
1−F 	
f 	
∀ (16)
K = min
{
 Uq0		−U2q0		
1−F 	
f 	
≥ K+cq0		
}
(17)
Also, if U122q 	≤ 0, then q∗1 	 > 0 for all  > K , and
the optimal contract is therefore fully revealing for all cus-
tomers who use nonzero quantities.
Proposition 3 indicates that increases in the trans-
action costs tend to increase prices correspondingly
and shrink the fraction of adopters of the informa-
tion good. Furthermore, for any K > 0, the optimal
usage-based contract is a nonlinear two-part tariff.
Because U10 	 > 0, it is clear from Equation (17)
that q0K	 > 0. As a consequence, there is a min-
imum price ∗K	 for usage above zero but lower
than q∗K	, and variable pricing beyond that. This
is a commonly observed pricing structure for digital
goods, and Proposition 3 establishes that it it always
induced when per-customer transaction costs have a
usage-independent component K > 0.
4.2. Independence of Fixed-Fee and
Usage-Based Pricing
The result of this subsection shows that the optimal
usage-based pricing schedule in the presence of an
unlimited-usage ﬁxed fee is independent of the value
of the ﬁxed fee. As a consequence, the simultaneous
derivation of the optimal combination of usage-based
and ﬁxed-fee pricing is simpliﬁed considerably.
Using Proposition 3, we know how to design
the pricing schedule q∗	 ∗		 that is optimal in
the absence of a ﬁxed fee. While Proposition 2 has
established the desirability of a ﬁxed-fee contract T
in addition, it does not indicate what the optimal
value of T should be. When a fraction F  ¯ of
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the customers no longer adopt the optimal usage-
based contract q∗	 ∗		, the ﬁrm may want to
redesign pricing for the remaining customer types
 F  in a proﬁt-improving way. This may change
the value of the lowest type F who is indifferent.
Consequently, to evaluate the net proﬁt impact of
each feasible ﬁxed fee, one needs to consider opti-
mally redesigned usage-based contracts for a contin-
uum of subintervals. Moreover, it is not guaranteed
that a combination of this form is in fact optimal—
for instance, a higher value of T and a correspond-
ingly constrained incentive-compatible contract may
be more proﬁtable. Therefore, to ﬁnd the optimal
combination, the ﬁrm needs to vary T while simulta-
neously considering all feasible incentive-compatible
contracts (and their proﬁts from corresponding adop-
tion) under the constraints imposed by the existence
of each T . Proposition 4 describes the solution to this
problem.
Proposition 4. The optimal usage-based contract in
the presence of the optimal ﬁxed fee is independent of the
value of the ﬁxed fee, and is identical to the optimal usage-
based contract in the absence of any ﬁxed fee. Consequently,
the optimal combination of ﬁxed-fee and usage-based con-
tracts can be constructed as follows.
(a) Determine the optimal usage-based contract
q∗·	 ∗·		 using Proposition 3.
(b) Find the optimal interval of types ∗F  ¯ that should
adopt the ﬁxed-fee contract by solving
∗F =argmax
F
∫ F
K
∗	−Cq∗		f 	d
+1−F F vF 	−Uq∗F 	F 	+∗F 	 (18)
(c) Determine the optimal ﬁxed-fee contract
T ∗ = v∗F 	−Uq∗∗F 	 ∗F 	+ ∗∗F 	 (19)
Proposition 4 is a surprising result. It shows that
when the ﬁrm offers the optimal ﬁxed-fee contract,
and this contract is adopted by a positive fraction of
customers, the optimal usage-based contract offered
to the remaining customers remains unchanged, even
though the usage-based contract is being designed
for a different (and smaller) interval of customers.
Were the seller to design a usage-based contract exclu-
sively for this smaller interval, ignoring the ﬁxed
fee, it would always be different from q∗	 ∗		.
When the ﬁrm does take the introduction of the ﬁxed
fee into account, this introduces a new (and inﬁnite)
set of individual rationality inequality constraints,
which change as one varies either the level of the
ﬁxed fee T or the subinterval F  ¯ that the ﬁrm
wants to induce to adopt T . Either of these changes
necessitates a redesign of optimal usage-based pric-
ing. Proposition 4 reduces this complicated sequence
to a simple problem of determining a globally opti-
mal usage-based pricing schedule and then solving
an unconstrained maximization problem in a single
variable.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 4 is that the
introduction of the optimal ﬁxed-fee contract (and the
consequent adjustment of customer usage) does not
reduce the surplus of any customer, relative to the
scenario in which only usage-based pricing is offered.
Because the surplus of those customers adopting the
ﬁxed-fee increases, this means that consumer sur-
plus strictly increases as well. Proposition 2 ensures
that ﬁrm proﬁts also strictly increase, implying that
total surplus also increases on account of the ﬁxed
fee.
Apart from per-customer transaction costs Cq	, the
seller may also bear a setup cost of administering a
usage-based contract, which is incurred if the seller
wishes to offer usage-based pricing to any fraction
of customers. This kind of cost increases the likeli-
hood that the seller will offer just ﬁxed-fee pricing
and forego usage-based pricing entirely. However, if
the seller still chooses to offer usage-based pricing,
this cost does not alter the optimal pricing schedules
and does not affect any of the results derived above.
This is discussed further in the paper’s extended
appendix (available at http://mansci.pubs.informs.
org/ecompanion.html).
5. Example and Discussion
The general results derived above are applied to a
simple example, and some managerial guidelines are
drawn from this exercise. In the example, the cus-
tomers’ utility function is assumed to be
Uq	= w+ 	q− 12q2 for q ≤w+  (20)
Uq	= w+ 	
2
2
for q >w+  (21)
It is easily veriﬁed that U122q 	 = 0, and therefore,
the conditions in Proposition 3 describe the unique
optimal usage-based contract. The transaction cost
function takes the form Cq	 = K + cq. In addition,
customer types are assumed to have the beta distri-
bution6 with parameters a = 0, b ≥ 1, and support
 ∈ 01.
Applying Proposition 3 yields the optimal usage-
based contract q∗	 ∗		, summarized in Table 2.
The corresponding expressions for K (the lowest type
adopting the usage-based contract, as speciﬁed in
Proposition 3) and ∗F (the lowest type adopting the
ﬁxed-fee contract, as speciﬁed in Proposition 4) are
6 The general form of the beta density function is
Ba b	= 
a−11− 	b−1
&a b	

where &a b	= ∫ 10 xa−11−x	b−1 dx is the beta function with param-
eters a and b.
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Table 2 Optimal Contracts and Indifferent Customer Types in the Example
Example: Uq = w + q− 12 q2; Cq= K + cq; F = 1− 1− b
Optimal usage-based contract: q∗= +w−
(
c+ 1− 
b
)
;
 ∗= 1+ bc+w
1+ b q
∗− q
∗	2
21+ b
(A) Uniform type distribution: b= 1, w ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, K ≥ 0
Lowest adopter of usage-based contract K =
2K + 1− w − c2
21+w − c
Lowest adopter of ﬁxed-fee contract ∗F = 1−
(√
4c2+ 2c
(
1+w − c
2
)
+ 2K − 2c
)
(B) Positively-skewed type distribution: b > 1, w = 0, c ≥ 0, K = 0
Lowest adopter of usage-based contract K =
1+ bc
1+ b
Lowest adopter of ﬁxed-fee contract ∗F = 1−
b
√
4b2c2+ c2− c2b− 1− 2bc
2b− 1
summarized in Table 2 for two separate cases. In the
ﬁrst case, customer types are uniformly distributed
b = 1	. In the second case, the customer type distri-
bution is positively skewed b > 1	, and the values of
K and w are normalized to zero. A detailed example
in which customer types are exponentially distributed
is presented in the paper’s extended appendix.
5.1. Transaction Costs and Adoption Levels
The changes induced in adoption as transaction costs
vary are illustrated in Figure 2, for the case of uni-
formly distributed . An increase in the ﬁxed trans-
action cost K results in a strict increase in K and
a strict decrease in ∗F , thereby increasing the frac-
tion of customers who adopt the ﬁxed fee, reducing
the set of customers who adopt the usage-based con-
tract, and also reducing total adoption. A directionally
identical change occurs with an increase in c. There-
fore, a reduction in either the ﬁxed transaction costs of
administering usage-based pricing (from an increase
in the adoption of online billing, for instance) or of
the variable transaction costs of administering usage-
based pricing (from increased ease of using online
customer support, for instance) should induce sellers
to alter their pricing structures in a manner that shifts
users away from ﬁxed-fee pricing.
5.2. Proﬁts, Surplus, and Welfare
Based on the expressions derived in Table 2, deriv-
ing expressions for proﬁts, customer surplus and total
surplus is straightforward. These expressions are alge-
braically cumbersome and are omitted for brevity,
but are illustrated in Figure 3 for K = 0. Proﬁts are
strictly decreasing in both c and K upto a point,
after which they are constant, because no more cus-
tomers adopt usage-based pricing. Consumer surplus
decreases with c and K initially, then increases, and
is often higher at those values of cK	 for which
only usage-based contracts are offered than it is
for c=K = 0. Interestingly, total surplus (the sum of
proﬁts and consumer surplus) decreases initially in c,
but then increases as c increases, though it attains its
maximum at c=K = 0.
The economic intuition behind these observations
is explained in Figure 4, for changes in c, with K
normalized to zero. There are two sets of effects that
an increase in c has on total surplus. First, there is
a negative indirect effect—owing to the reduction in
both the number of adopters of the usage-based con-
tract, and the quantity used by each, total customer
utility reduces. Second, there is a direct cost effect—
the transaction costs borne by the ﬁrm per unit of
usage increases, which changes both ﬁrm proﬁts and
total surplus. However, the decrease in usage by the
adopters of usage-based pricing may offset this cost
increase. There are also two positive indirect effects,
however. An increase in c increases the number of
adopters of the ﬁxed-fee contract, and all of these cus-
tomers enjoy higher utility levels, at their maximum
value v	. In addition, these customers no longer
impose the transaction costs K + cq∗	 on the ﬁrm.
The negative effects dominates for lower values of c,
after which the positive indirect effects dominate.
5.3. Customer Value and Market Evolution
The changes in adoption when either w or b vary are
more subtle. An increase in w results in a decrease in
both K and ∗F , as shown in Figure 5. This indicates an
increase in both the total number of adopters, as well
as the fraction of adopters of the ﬁxed fee. For param-
eter values of interest.7 K decreases more rapidly
than ∗F with a marginal increase in w, and therefore
7 More precisely, for any c and K such that there are at least some
adopters of the usage-based contract, it can be shown that d∗F /dw >
− 12 , while dK/dw <− 12 , which implies that d∗F /dw > dK/dw.
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Figure 2 How Increasing Transaction Costs K and c Affects Customer Adoption
Adopters of the
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Figure 3 Changes in Proﬁts and Surplus as Transaction Costs Vary
37(1 )
162
w+
3(1 )
24
w+
Consumer 
surplus
0 1
3
w+
c
3(1 )
12
w+
32(1 )
27
w+
Seller profits
0 1
3
w+
c
0 1
3
w+
c
Total 
surplus
3(1 )
8
w+
319(1 )
162
w+
Figure 4 The Drivers of Changes in Total Surplus: A Closer Look
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Figure 5 The Impact of an Increase in Marginal Customer Value w on Customer Adoption
Adopters of the
fixed-fee contract
Adopters of the
usage-based contract
Switched from not adopting to Switch from usage based to
fixed fee as w increases
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Nonadopters
usage based as w increases
the number of adopters ∗F − K	 of the usage-based
contract increases as well. Changes in b alter the shape
of the type distribution as well, and their effect on
adoption is ascertained by examining the signs of the
total derivatives d/db	1− F ∗F 	 and d/db	F ∗F 	−
F K	, which measure the net changes on the fraction
of customers adopting the ﬁxed-fee and usage-based
pricing schedules. The former is positive and the lat-
ter is negative, suggesting a shift away from ﬁxed-fee
pricing as b decreases.8
Early-stage information or technology markets
commonly feature a high concentration of occasional
experimenters on the low end of the market, along
with a small fraction of active early innovators who
constitute a bulk of total usage. As the market
matures, the distribution of customers over usage lev-
els evens out. For instance, average monthly usage
levels per customer in the online services market
increased steadily over the ﬁrst few years of the Inter-
net boom—as of late 2001, average AOL usage had
more than doubled to about 40 hours per month—
and Jupiter Media-Metrix survey data from May 2001
on overall U.S. residential online usage indicates that
the distribution of customers over usage levels has
ﬂattened out, especially below the mean. This is the
kind of distributional change corresponding to a grad-
ual decrease in b. The analysis above indicates that it
is optimal for the provider to penetrate such a mar-
ket initially with a pricing scheme that induces the
adoption of a relatively low ﬁxed fee. Over time, they
should gradually increase this ﬁxed fee, while induc-
ing an increase in the adoption of usage-based pric-
ing. Moreover, if the product becomes more valuable
on average (from the addition of new features over
time, for instance, which corresponds to an increase
in w), this is also optimally responded to by increas-
ing the fraction of customers who adopt usage-based
pricing.
5.4. Minimum Fees and Quantity Discounting
Inspection of the usage-based contract in Table 2 indi-
cates that the explicit usage-based pricing function of
8 Similar results are obtained for the exponential distribution, which
is also positively skewed, and this analysis is available in the
extended appendix of the paper.
the seller takes the form
pq	=
(
1+ bc+w
1+ b
)
q− q
2
21+ b	 for q ≥ q
∗K	 (22)
As discussed in §4.1, when K > 0, then q∗K	 > 0, and
consequently, this is a nonlinear two-part tariff, which
speciﬁes a minimum fee of ∗K	 for a usage level
between 0 and a prespeciﬁed upper limit q∗K	, and
additional variable payments for usage above q∗K	.
Moreover, the function pq	 is strictly concave, indi-
cating an increasing level of volume discounts with
usage. A useful measure of the percentage of dis-
counting is the expression −p11q	/p1q		, which mea-
sures the rate of decrease p11q	 of the variable price
(or analogously, the concavity of the pricing function),
normalized for variable price p1q	. From (22),
−p11q	
p1q	
= 1
1+ bc+w− q  (23)
Therefore, as w increases, the percentage discount
offered should progressively decrease. Intuitively, the
increase in marginal value increases the level of usage
chosen by each customer; moreover, it is optimal
for the ﬁrm to induce a higher fraction of the mar-
ket to adopt its ﬁxed-fee contract, as illustrated in
Figure 4. The relative beneﬁts of the quantity discount
for the ﬁrm are consequently lower, which leads to
a decrease in the discount. Similarly, an increase in
c results in a decrease in the percentage discount.
While the direction of the result is similar, the intu-
ition is slightly different—in this case, the ﬁrm does
so because it optimally wants to induce lower usage
for all adopters of the usage-based contract, as well
as shifting a fraction of them to the ﬁxed fee.
6. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has established that in the presence of any
positive transaction costs, sellers of information goods
should offer their customers a combination of usage-
based pricing and unlimited-usage ﬁxed-fee pricing.
These conclusions contrast with well-known results
from nonlinear pricing theory under assumptions sim-
ilar to those made in this paper (see, for instance,
Maskin and Riley 1984 or Wilson 1993), which sug-
gest that optimal monopoly pricing structure is purely
Sundararajan: Nonlinear Pricing of Information Goods
1670 Management Science 50(12), pp. 1660–1673, © 2004 INFORMS
usage based and fully revealing. These models do not
generally explicitly consider transaction costs. I show
that the optimality of pure second-degree price dis-
crimination is highly sensitive to the absence of these
transaction costs—Proposition 2 has established that
when there are no variable production costs, a purely
usage-based pricing scheme is never optimal for any
Cq	 > 0. This is an important new conclusion for any
seller developing pricing policy for their information
goods.
Proposition 4 proves that the optimal usage-based
contract is independent of the ﬁxed fee, which
reduces a complex constrained problem to a relatively
simpler and more tractable one. The assumptions
needed on customer preferences and heterogeneity
for this result to work are fairly mild. Applying
Proposition 4 is relatively straightforward, as illus-
trated in §5 and the paper’s extended appendix. It is
hoped that this result will enable further development
of focused and rigorous models for speciﬁc informa-
tion pricing problems.
These results generalize existing pricing guidelines
for information goods. For instance, Varian (2000)
proved that with two customer types and linear util-
ity, a “buy only” pricing regime (which corresponds
to offering only an unlimited usage ﬁxed fee in our
model) is strictly preferable to one that includes rent-
ing (usage-based pricing in our model) as long as
the transaction costs of renting are positive (nonzero
transaction costs Cq	 in our model). This result is
intuitively appealing and highlights the importance of
considering transaction costs when pricing informa-
tion goods. By generalizing this intuition, this paper
has established that while ﬁxed fees are always prof-
itable, the two kinds of pricing schemes can optimally
coexist.
Moreover, all of the paper’s results about the opti-
mal design of pricing schedules continue to hold even
if these transaction costs are borne by the customer
rather than by the seller. For instance, when con-
suming under a usage-based pricing schedule, the
customer may bear costs of monitoring and control-
ling their cumulative monthly usage. Even under this
scenario, it is always optimal for the seller to offer
both ﬁxed-fee as well as usage-based pricing, and if
the costs borne by customers are high enough, only
the ﬁxed fee. This provides one explanation for why
Sprint recently switched from per-Mb usage-based
pricing to ﬁxed-fee pricing for their wireless Web ser-
vice. Optimal usage levels q∗	 for this problem are
analytically identical to those derived in this paper,
and the expressions for optimal total prices can be
obtained by simply adjusting the corresponding ∗	
expressions downward by the transaction costs borne
by the customer at each usage level q∗	.
In the absence of transaction costs, Lemma 4 of the
paper conﬁrms that pure usage-based second-degree
price discrimination is still optimal, even for zero-
variable cost information goods. An example of a
digital product category that uses this pricing strat-
egy is back-end corporate software (such as database
engines and application servers). Pricing is tied to
server processor speed, and transaction costs are elim-
inated by coding the maximum allowable processor
speed into the software delivered.
Some other key managerial insights from the paper
are summarized below.
• As advances in electronic business transactions
drive down the costs associated with administering
usage-based contracts, sellers of information goods
should adjust their pricing policy to increase the scope
and adoption of their usage-based pricing schedules.
• If the administering of usage-based pricing in-
volves a ﬁxed per-customer transaction cost which
is triggered by any positive usage level, the optimal
usage-based pricing schedule should include a mini-
mum fee for usage upto a prespeciﬁed level, and vari-
able pricing beyond this.
• Typically, the variable pricing described above
will feature volume discounts. Moreover, the extent
of discounting should decrease as marginal value
increases but increase as variable transaction costs
reduce, or as the customer distribution becomes less
skewed.
• In early-stage information markets characterized
by a high concentration of low-usage customers and
a small fraction of active early adopters, low ﬁxed-fee
penetration pricing is a good strategy. This is espe-
cially true if there are setup or periodic infrastruc-
ture costs associated with administering usage-based
pricing. As the market matures and the distribution
of customers across different usage levels evens out,
sellers should increase their ﬁxed fees and gradually
expand their usage-based pricing options.
Propositions 2 and 4 also complement the basic
rationale for bundling information goods, as pre-
scribed by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)—that a
larger bundle of information goods increases the aver-
age customer valuation per unit good. Therefore, if
the bundle is treated as the potential set of goods the
consumer might use, marginal value from usage for
each customer will increase with the size of the bun-
dle. When the seller chooses the right combination
of ﬁxed-fee and usage-based contracts, this increase
in per-unit value will lead to an increase the frac-
tion of customers who choose a usage-based contract.
The seller will also be able to extract more surplus
from customers than it would have either under pure
bundling or with a smaller bundle.
If one were to interpret q in our model as quality
instead of quantity, it is identical to one of vertical
differentiation, with a continuum of possible product
versions, a continuum of customer types, and costs of
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versioning according to Cq	. In the context of infor-
mation goods with multiple features, where quality is
proportionate to the number of features, Proposition 2
indicates that if versioning is costly, it is always opti-
mal to offer a high-priced version with all possible
features that allows customers to self-customize (that
is, choose the features that they want). This is consis-
tent with Jones and Mendelson (1998) and Bhargava
and Choudhury (2001). However, Proposition 4 indi-
cates that it is often optimal to offer limited-feature
versions as well, and that these will be adopted by a
subset of customers as long as the cost of versioning
is not too high.
The cost structure of information goods often leads
to natural monopoly. However, competition is also a
signiﬁcant issue in pricing, and a focus of my ongoing
work is competitive nonlinear pricing for information
goods. Undifferentiated nonlinear price competition
is not sustainable for information goods, because the
equilibrium outcome is either marginal cost pricing,
or minimum average cost pricing (Mandy 1992). The
latter outcome suggests inﬁnite-usage ﬁxed-fee pric-
ing, because the average cost per unit for information
goods is always strictly decreasing in usage. A promis-
ing alternative is presented by Fishburn et al. (1997),
who model a repeated game in which one player
chooses only a ﬁxed fee, and the other chooses only a
linear usage-based price. Approaches that may yield
more general results involve modeling horizontally
differentiated information goods (as in the monopoly
model of Weber 2001 and the duopoly model of Rochet
and Stole 2002), using a model of monopolistic compe-
tition (as in Banker et al. 1998), or modeling the pres-
ence of an outside good (as in Jullien 2000). I hope to
add to this literature in the near future.
An electronic companion to this paper is available
at http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html.
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that q1	 < 0 for some .
This implies that qˆ	 > qˆ + '	 for some ˆ ∈  ¯ and
some ' > 0. Applying the condition [IC] at ˆ and ˆ + '	
respectively yields
[IC] at ˆ U qˆ	ˆ	−ˆ	≥Uqˆ+'	ˆ	−ˆ+'	
(A1)
[IC] at ˆ+'	 Uqˆ+'	ˆ+'	−ˆ+'	
≥Uqˆ	ˆ+'	−ˆ	 (A2)
Combining (A1) and (A2) and eliminating ˆ	− ˆ+ '	
yields
U
(
qˆ	 ˆ+ '	−Uqˆ+ '	 ˆ+ ')
≥Uqˆ	 ˆ	−Uqˆ+ '	 ˆ	 (A3)
Because qˆ	 > qˆ + '	, and ˆ + ' > ˆ, Equation (A3)
implies that U2q 	 ≤ 0 for some  ∈ ˆ ˆ + '—a contra-
diction. This proves that q1	≥ 0 for all . Now, applying
ﬁrst-order conditions for [IC] to hold for customer type 
yields
U1q	 	q1	− 1	= 0 for all  (A4)
which ensures that q1	 ≥ 0⇒ 1	 ≥ 0, and proves part
(a). Furthermore,
d
d
Uq	 	− 	
=U1q	 	q1	+U2q	 	− 1	 (A5)
Combining (A4) and (A5) and using U2q 	 > 0 establishes
part (b), and complete the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that 	= v	−Uq		+
	. Differentiating both sides with respect to  and using
(A4) yields
1	= v1	−U2q	 	 (A6)
Because v	 = limq→	Uq	, it follows that v1	 =
limq→	U2q 	. Because U12q 	 > 0, and Uq	 is mono-
tonic in q, this implies that v1	 > U2q 	 for all q < 	,
which in turn implies that 1	 > 0 so long as q	 < 	,
and completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that ∗	 − Cq∗		 is
strictly decreasing at some L ∈  ¯. We can therefore
deﬁne a type H > L as
H =min
{
  > L and 
∗	−Cq∗		
= ∗L	−Cq∗L		
}
 (A7)
with H = ¯ if a type H ∈  ¯ according to (A7) does not
exist. The continuity of ∗	 q∗	 and Cq	 ensures that
∗	−Cq∗		 < ∗L	−Cq∗L		 (A8)
for all  ∈ L H	. Now, deﬁne the contract q	 	 as
follows:
q	= q∗	 	= ∗	 for   L H (A9)
q	= q∗&		 	= ∗&		 for  ∈ L H (A10)
where
&	 = L if Uq∗L		−∗L	
≥ Uq∗H		−∗H	 (A11)
&	 = H if Uq∗L		−∗L	
< Uq∗H		−∗H	 (A12)
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Because q∗	 ∗	 is incentive compatible, and U2q 	 >
0, it is easily shown that q	 	 is also incentive compat-
ible. Moreover, because f 	 >  for all , (A8) implies that
the seller’s proﬁts by offering q	 	 are strictly higher
than those from q∗	 ∗	, which contradicts the fact that
q∗	 ∗	 is optimal, and proves part (a).
An identical argument for each subinterval L H
whose interior in which ∗	−Cq∗		 is strictly negative
establishes part (b). The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3. This proposition uses the fol-
lowing lemma, a slight generalization of a well-known
result (Maskin and Riley 1984), which is proved in the
extended appendix.
Lemma 4. If the ﬁxed component of transaction costs is zero,
and therefore Cq	 = cq	, then the unique optimal usage-based
contract q	 	 for any interval L H satisﬁes the following
conditions for all  ∈ L H:
U1q	 	= c1q		+U12q	 	
F H	− F 	
f 	
 (A13)
	=Uq		−
∫ 
L
U2qx	 x	dx (A14)
Also, if U122q 	≤ 0, then q1	 > 0 for all  such that q	 > 0.
The problem above is termed the zero-ﬁxed-cost problem for
the interval L H. An important feature of this lemma is
that the allocation q	 is independent of the lower support
L. Therefore, for each  ∈ L H, the value of q	 that
is optimal for L H is the same as the value of q	 that
would be optimal for the interval  H. Total payment
	 increases with L, of course.
Now, let q∗	 ∗	 be the optimal usage-based contract
for the entire interval, and for a given K > 0. Term this the
solution to the positive ﬁxed-cost problem. Deﬁne ( ⊂  ¯
as the set of types who use nonzero quantities under this
contract:
(=  q∗	 > 0 (A15)
Clearly, ∗	 = 0 for   (. From Lemma 1(a), we know
that q∗1 	 ≥ 0, which implies that ( is a continuous inter-
val K ¯, where K ≥  (this is ignoring the trivial case
where ( is empty and the ﬁrm makes no proﬁts). Also,
from Lemma 3(b), we know that for each  ∈ K ¯,
∗	≥K+ cq∗		 (A16)
Next, we establish that q∗	 ∗	 is also the optimal con-
tract for the zero-ﬁxed-cost problem for the interval K ¯.
If we assume the converse, the uniqueness result of
Lemma 4 therefore implies the existence of an incentive-
compatible contract q	 	 such that
∫ ¯
K
	− cq		f 	d
>
∫ ¯
K
∗	− cq∗		 f 	d (A17)
which implies that
∫ ¯
K
	− cq		−Kf 	d
>
∫ ¯
K
∗	− cq∗		−Kf 	d (A18)
Because ∗	 = q∗	 = 0 for  < K , (A18) implies that
q	 	 is a more proﬁtable solution to the positive ﬁxed-
cost problem than q∗	 ∗	—a contradiction. Therefore,
q∗	 always satisﬁes
U1q
∗	 	= c1q∗		+U12q∗	 	
1− F 	
f 	
 (A19)
which speciﬁes a unique q∗	 for each  that is also inde-
pendent of the value of K . The result follows by choosing
the K that maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁts
∫ ¯
K
∗	−cq∗		−
Kf 	d, while taking into account the dependence of ∗	
on K . 
Proof of Proposition 4. Given an interval K ¯ and
a type F ∈ K ¯	, suppose that with ﬁxed costs of zero,
the ﬁrm wants to design the optimal usage-based contract
qˆ	 ˆ	 and the optimal ﬁxed fee T , subject to the con-
straint that all customer types  ≥ F adopt the ﬁxed fee,
and all customer types in the subinterval K F  adopt the
usage-based contract. We term this a constrained zero-ﬁxed-
cost problem for the interval K ¯ with a constraint on F .
Proposition 2 has shown that constraining customers of
type F to be indifferent between any ﬁxed-fee contract T
and the usage-based contract will ensure that all types  ∈
K F 	 will choose the usage-based contract, and all types
 ≥ F will choose the ﬁxed fee. Therefore, from the proof of
Lemma 4, we know that this problem of ﬁnding qˆ	 ˆ	
and T can be formulated as
max
q·	 T
(∫ F
K
[
Uq		− cq		−U2q	 	
· F F 	− F 	
f 	
]
f 	d
)
+ T 1− F F 		 (A20)
subject to the constraint(∫ F
K
U2q	 	d
)
− vF 	− T = 0 (A21)
Denote the Lagrangian for this problem as
Lq·	T )	
=
∫ F
K
(
Uq		−cq		−U2q		
F F 	−F 	
f 	
)
f 	d
+T 1−F F 	+)
[(∫ F
K
U2q		d
)
−vF 	+T
]

(A22)
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for any local maxi-
mizer to this constrained problem are[
L
q
=0
]

(
U1q		−c1q		−U12q		
·
[
F F 	−F 	−)
f 	
])
f 	=0 ∀∈ KF 
(A23)[
L
T
=0
]
 1−F F 	+)=0 (A24)
and [
L
)
= 0
]

∫ F
K
U2q	 	d= vF 	− T  (A25)
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Rearranging (A24) yields the value of the Lagrangian
multiplier
)=−1− F F 	 (A26)
Substituting (A26) into (A23) yields(
U1q	 	− c−U12q	 	
·
[
F F 	− F 	− −1− F F 		
f 	
])
f 	= 0 (A27)
which simpliﬁes to
U1q	 	 = c1q		+U12q	 	
[
1− F 	
f 	
]
∀ ∈ K F  (A28)
Equation (A28) implies that for any constrained zero-ﬁxed
cost problem, the usage-based quantity q	 optimally cho-
sen by each type  in K F  is independent of K , inde-
pendent of F , and is also independent of the value of the
ﬁxed fee T .
Now, suppose q∗	 ∗	, and T ∗ are a solution to the
seller’s original problem of choosing the optimal combi-
nation of usage-based pricing and ﬁxed-fee, for a speciﬁc
K > 0, and for the entire interval  ¯. Let K ¯ be the
set of types for which q∗	 > 0. If all types K ¯ adopt
T ∗, the main result is trivially true. If not, Proposition 2
ensures that there is a customer type ∗F ∈ K ¯	 who is
indifferent between adopting q∗	 ∗	 and adopting T ∗,
and Proposition 1 ensures that all types in ∗F  ¯ adopt T
∗.
It now follows that the contracts q∗	 ∗	, and T ∗ must
also be a solution to the problem of choosing the optimal
combination of usage-based pricing and ﬁxed-fee, for a con-
strained zero-cost-problem for the interval K ¯, and with
constraint on the type ∗F . Suppose it is not such a solution.
This implies the existence of q	 	, and T such that
types K ∗F 	 adopt q	 	, types 
∗
F  ¯ adopt T , and∫ ∗F
K
	− cq		f 	d+ T 1− F ∗F 	
>
∫ ∗F
L
∗	− cq∗		f 	d+ T ∗1− F ∗F 	 (A29)
Subtracting KF ∗F 	− F K	 from both sides of (A29) im-
plies that q	 	 and T satisfy
∫ ∗F
K
	−cq		−Kf 	d+T 1−F ∗F 	
>
∫ ∗F
L
∗	−cq∗		−Kf 	d+T ∗1−F ∗F 	 (A30)
which contradicts the fact that q∗	 ∗	, and T ∗ are a
solution to the seller’s original problem. Because (A28)
is necessary forany solution to the constrained zero-cost-
problem, it follows that
U1q
∗	 	 = c1q∗		+U12q∗	 	
[
1− F 	
f 	
]
∀ ∈ K ¯ (A31)
Note that the expressions in (A31) are independent of K
and are also independent of T ∗. This proves part (a). The
value of the ﬁxed-fee at which type F is indifferent is
vF 	−Uq∗F 	 F 	+ ∗F 	. Part (b) follows from the fact
that the ﬁrm will choose the proﬁt maximizing value of ∗F ,
and that the corresponding optimal usage-based contract
q∗	 ∗		 is independent of the choice of ∗F . Part (c)
simply computes the ﬁxed-fee T ∗ at this optimal value
of ∗F . 
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